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Abstract 
 
Based on analysing the post-Soviet transformation experience of four defence sector 
organisations in a Russian region where the defence sector occupies a substantial part of the 
local economy, this article develops a typology of network relationships: Grooved Inter-
relationship Patterns (Gr’ip) networks and Fluid Inter-relationship Patterns (Fl’ip) 
networks. This typology can be applied to a range of transition/emerging market and low 
system trust contexts.  Gr’ip networks, in this case, represent the persisting legacy of the 
Soviet command-administrative system. Fl’ip networks are here an attempt by the defence 
companies to link into the civilian supply chains of a developing market economy. This 
article argues that Gr’ip networks had and still have a crucial role to play in Russian 
enterprises’ survival and development.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The economic and social reforms introduced in Eastern Europe and Russia in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s were aimed at building a market-type system on the ruins of a command-
administrative one.  The legacy of the socialist past continues to persist, however, with ties 
from the socialist period proving essential for organisations’ survival and the development of 
coping strategies during the process of economic and social transformation (Stark and Bruszt, 
1998; McCann, 2005; McDermott, 2007). This article scrutinises the administrative links that 
bound organisations to the local/regional and national authorities and the role of trust and 
power in the development of these links, and exposes the crucial role these links played in the 
organisations’ survival and subsequent development. In doing so, it reveals ways in which the 
paths followed by the enterprises studied did not conform to economic rules and mechanisms 
assumed by western neo-liberal economists (Soulsby and Clark, 2007).  
According to the neo-liberal approach restructuring would take place through the 
process of corporatisation and privatisation, and large, formerly state-owned enterprises 
would unbundle the profitable aspects of their operations from the non-profitable ones (see, 
for example, Blanchard et al., 1994; Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Carlin et al., 1994). Many 
Russian defence enterprises, however, did not follow this pattern; these companies stayed 
intact, and managed to preserve most of their scientific and technological potential (and 
capital) by contracting and/or “freezing” some of the production shops rather than cutting 
them off and closing them down. Studying how these organisations (both state-owned and 
privatised) survived the huge changes which occurred during the Russian transition can help 
expand our understanding of how organisations respond to institutional change during a 
process of creating market institutions (Peng, 2003). This study thus contributes to the 
growing organisational and management literature on post-socialist and emerging market 
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economies on the one hand, and to the literature on networks highlighting the previously 
overlooked role of links between industrial organisations and public bodies, on the other. 
The findings of the study suggest the vital role of networks in the studied 
organisations’ survival and development in Russia’s forming market-type system. The 
networks were based on Soviet-era administrative ties between defence companies and local 
and national-level authorities, developed in that era with the aim of sustaining defence 
production. In the transition period Russian defence companies maintained and developed 
these networks as a response to the institutional changes within the post-Soviet context. 
Studying networks, trust and power within the Russian defence industry, where the state and 
local/regional administrations have a substantial influence on both state-owned and privatised 
enterprises
1
, provided rich data which allowed for the development of a typology of 
networks, which can be applied to other post-socialist and emerging market societies as well 
as other contexts of low system trust. 
 
NETWORKS, TRUST AND POWER 
 
The importance of networks in developed market economies has been stressed by 
Granovetter (1985), who emphasized the embeddedness of economic action in social 
relations. This argument applies equally well in the case of networks in Eastern Europe.  In 
conditions of change from a command-administrative system to a market system, when the 
institutional framework of a market economy is developing, generalized trust in the emergent 
institutions remains low, especially in the case of post-Soviet Russia (Mishler and Rose, 
1998; Rose, 1998; Hanson, 2002; Shalpentokh, 2006). Institutions (formal or informal) are 
‘the rules of the game’ that the institutional framework provides. These institutions both 
constrain and enable the regulation of economic activities in a society (North, 1990; Schmid, 
2004).  Russia is characterized by an uncertain institutional environment with low reliability 
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of the law and of courts (Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Ledeneva, 2009), an inadequate legal 
framework (Levin and Satarov, 2000; Prokhorov, 2002), and underdeveloped strategic factor 
markets (Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 2003; Dynkin, 2004). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
trust is placed on individuals rather than institutions (Kholodkovski, 1998), and personal 
relationships are heavily relied upon (Ayios, 2004; Batjargal, 2007). Previous research has 
emphasized the necessity for managers to cultivate personal connections in conditions where 
there is a weak rule of law and a government which does not support a stable regulatory 
environment (Boisot, 1986), whereby impersonal business transactions (Zucker, 1986) are 
inhibited. The importance of networks of personal relationships has a long history and was 
not only an important part of Soviet reality, but of tsarist Russia as well (Ledeneva, 1998). 
Personal contacts with members of the political elites, including those of the previous Soviet 
regime, were highlighted as being important for both domestic companies and for foreign 
investors (Halinen and Törnroos, 1998; McCann, 2005). 
Networks of personal relationships and personal trust rather than trust in the system, 
or system trust, are the basis for interactions between organisations in the private and state-
controlled sectors (for a discussion of personal trust and system trust see Bachmann, 2001). 
Networks are based on personal contacts and are defined as a “set of nodes (e.g., persons, 
organisations) linked by a set of social relationships (e.g., friendship, transfer of funds, 
overlapping membership) of a specified type” (Laumann et al., 1978: 458).  The emphasis 
within administrative networks is on preferential treatment through lobbying, whereas, the 
emphasis within firm-to-firm networks is on creation of products or services based on 
implicit and open-ended contracts (Jones  et al., 1997).  
Interpersonal trust underpins both these types of network. Trust is “the willingness of 
a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor 
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or control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995: 712); Luhmann (1979) argues that 
complexity and uncertainty are reduced by accepting one’s vulnerability to the actions of the 
other. Production of trust is rooted in social relations and the obligations inherent in them 
(Misztal, 1996). According to Zucker (1986: 60), there are three main modes of trust 
production: (1) process-based (trust is tied to past or expected exchange); (2) characteristic-
based (trust is tied to the person, based on family background or ethnicity characteristics); 
and (3) institutionally-based (trust is tied to broad societal institutions). Bachmann and 
Inkpen (2011) stress the importance of institutional-based trust rather than relying on 
interaction-based forms of trust alone, however, in the Russian context where institutions 
(including those that can help reduce the risk of misplaced trust, especially legal regulations) 
are weak, interaction-based trust retains its significance. It is thus relational trust, based on 
experience and interaction with a particular exchange partner (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), 
that is significant in this context. Previous research has demonstrated that trust in economic 
relationships is built on prior experiences (Mayer et al., 1995; Das and Teng, 1998), but it  
doesn’t just develop over a period of time, what is required is an expectation of continuance 
of the interaction (Poppo et al., 2008).  
In relation to trust building, Sako (1992) identified three levels of trust: contractual 
trust (an expectation to abide by written or oral contractual obligation); competence trust (a 
belief that the necessary activities will be carried out competently and reliably); and goodwill 
trust (mutual expectations of exceeding stipulated contractual obligations). The latter is 
developed when an expectation exists that a favour will be returned and thus norms of 
reciprocity are established (Ireland and Webb, 2007). 
It has been argued that an inter-organisational relationship is predominantly based 
either on investing trust or on relying on resources of power and a threat of sanctions for 
undesirable behaviour (Bachmann, 2001). According to Molm (1997), actors can be mutually 
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dependent on each other for rewards, and this provides the basis for their power over each 
other. Molm (1997) distinguishes between coercive and non-coercive power. Coercive power 
involves gaining rewards using punishment or threatened sanctions through control of 
negative outcomes. Non-coercive power concerns providing or withholding rewards in order 
to promote desired behaviours. Mutual dependence between defence companies and local and 
regional authorities can give rise to the use of non-coercive power, as will be discussed in the 
typology section. 
The analysis of trust, power and networks has received much attention in the literature 
on networks in public administration, although the focus has been on networks surrounding 
the different stages of the policy process, such as formation, governance and policy 
implementation (Lecy et al., 2013), the latter being the remit of collaborative networks 
(McGuire, 2006; Head, 2008). Agranoff and McGuire (2001) emphasise the importance of 
trust as holding networks together. At the operational level of collaborative networks 
establishing trust and reciprocity is seen as important and each participant’s power and 
resources need to be assessed (Mandell and Keast, 2008). In the context of publicly funded 
services provision trust develops through repeated interactions or it can be a consequence of 
accreditation and licensing. Service providers have the power to determine the ways and 
conditions under which services are delivered (Tenbensel, 2005). The dependence of 
organisations on each other for resources creates a power dependence that affects the way 
these organisations interact and the way power is distributed within collaborative networks 
(Rhodes, 1997). Moreover, collaborators may not have a choice about who they need to 
collaborate with. This leads to suspicion as a starting point, rather than trust and the focus 
then shifts to trust building. Understanding of how power is exerted needs to be based on the 
understanding of where points of power lie on the micro level of the collaboration itself 
(Huxam, 2003). 
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Trust and power considerations such as these are relevant to the collaboration (within 
a network based on administrative ties) between defence companies and local and national-
level authorities analysed in this article. However, in this case the aim of the collaboration is 
to ensure these parties’ survival and development in conditions of institutional change as a 
new, market-type system is being created.   
This research aims to explain how the studied enterprises survived these conditions 
and to explore the significance of the identified network relationships in this. The aim is also 
to explore the particular characteristics of these networks in a specific context of the Russian 
defence industry, which has been as yet insufficiently tackled in the extant literature. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The data from the four defence enterprises considered here provides an illustration of how 
companies reacted to the transition process in post-Soviet Russia, presenting a longitudinal 
view of this process. The empirical data collection started with semi-structured interviews 
(lasting between 30 and 50 minutes) focusing on the defence enterprises’ economic and 
financial situation and on how they were coping with the changing economic conditions. 
These were conducted with directors and heads of either Chief Economist’s or Commercial 
departments at four defence enterprises in one Russian oblast’ (region)2, where the defence 
sector occupies a substantial part of the local economy. The choice of defence enterprises was 
determined by their significance for the regional economy in the pre-transition period. The 
names of the enterprises have been changed for confidentiality reasons. Two of the four 
companies were privatised in the beginning of the economic reforms in 1992 (Avia-Co and 
Mechanics-Co), and two were state-owned (Avia-Ent and Mechanics-Ent). The enterprises 
were visited between June and July 1995, and between September and October 1996 (see 
below for the discussion of the importance of this period); one follow-up interview was 
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carried out in December 2000 (see Table 1). Interviews were carried out in Russian with 
detailed notes made (recording was not permitted) and written up after the interviews. The 
written up notes were translated into English. Sources of information beyond the interviews 
included: in-house company publications; newspapers (local and national); company 
websites. Additional information was obtained from the local Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. Information updated beyond December 2000 is based on reports in Russian 
newspapers (local and national) and on the data provided by company websites. Secondary 
data were also translated from Russian into English. The increased emphasis on security in 
late 1990s and especially beyond 2000 affected access to the companies, preventing further 
interviews being undertaken. 
 
Table 1: Interviews per organisation 
 
 Avia-Co Avia-Ent Mechanics-Co Mechanics-Ent Total 
June-July 1995 Director 
 
Chief 
Economist 
Director 
 
Chief 
Economist 
Director 
 
Commercial 
Director 
Director 
 
Chief Economist 
 8 
 
September-
October 1996 
 
Chief 
Economist 
  
Commercial 
Director 
 
Director 
 
 
3 
 
 
December 2000 
 
Commercial 
Director 
    
1 
      
 
 
The reliability of these data was evaluated partly by making comparisons (direct or 
indirect) of these available sources, partly by evaluating the bias or non-bias or attitude of 
each source. This was done by comparing what the sources said about the organisations 
studied with what they said about other companies where it was easier to ascertain their 
degree of accuracy. Contacts in other fields of business, for example, offered useful feedback 
on certain newspapers and websites, describing how their businesses were represented. 
Discussions with industry experts helped to compare and contrast the findings with the 
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situation in other organisations of this sector. This provided a clearer picture of the angle 
taken by certain of the sources. Triangulation was achieved through comparing multiple 
sources of information (Yin, 1994). 
Interview data and secondary data were coded using the following six categories: 
organisation’s economic situation, indebtedness, working patterns, levels of employment, 
lobbying, networks of connections. The first four categories are derived from the established 
socio-economic analysis of company adjustment during the beginning stages of transition 
(see, for example, EBRD, 1994; Commander and Coricelli, 1995). The last two categories 
emerged from the data and were supported by the literature (Stark, 1996; Stark and Bruszt, 
1998). Analysis of these data demonstrated a consistently happening phenomenon (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984; Mason, 1996): financial stability of studied organisations depends on 
lobbying and networks of connections to local and national administrations. 
 
FINDINGS  
Background and general economic context  
 
The research covers the period from 1994 to the present time, however, what was happening 
to companies studied during 1994 – 1996 when most of the interviews took place is of special 
interest since this was the most difficult period of the Russian transition for industrial 
enterprises and the economy as a whole. After the start of the reforms in 1992 and continuing 
until 1998 there was a steady and extreme decline of the Russian economy (Potts, 1999). By 
1998 GDP (using constant prices) was 56% and industrial output was 46% of their pre-reform 
level (UNECE, 1999), and agricultural production and food processing had both decreased by 
40% (Goskomstat, 2000). According to Clarke (2007), the collapse of investment triggered a 
substantial decline in orders for the engineering and construction industries. Within the 
engineering sector, the military-industrial complex enterprises were facing the inability of the 
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government to pay for the orders that still remained. In the same period light industry’s 
output declined by 83% (Goskomstat, 2000), as consumer goods industries were under the 
pressure of increasing import competition; inflation with a stable (managed, with an 
‘adjustable peg’) exchange rate undermined the competitive advantage of domestic producers 
and, more importantly, consumers were keen to try the novel imported goods (Clarke, 2007). 
Within the Russian economy only the exporters of raw and processed materials experienced 
growth, indeed, these industries were booming as the decline in domestic demand for fuels, 
metals and chemicals meant these were available in larger volumes to be exported (Clarke, 
2007). 
The questions that were of interest from the start of the research were how the 
companies adjusted to new economic conditions during a critical period of transition in 
Russia (when defence enterprises experienced unprecedented economic upheaval) and what 
helped them to stay afloat. Through investigating their financial situation and generally their 
economic development it became clear that purely economic reasoning could not explain how 
they survived. It also became clear that networks of connections, especially to local/regional 
and national administrations played a significant part in the enterprises’ survival and 
development either as defence-oriented organisations or as organisations diversified into 
civilian production (in addition to their defence orientation).  
Table 2 shows the companies’ sub-sector (aviation, machine-building, metal-working 
or munitions), whether the company was privatised or not and the current ownership status. 
Privatisation resulted in the formation of open joint-stock companies (allowing outside 
shareholders). Avia-Ent’s state joint-stock company ownership status means that the state still 
has a controlling stake in the company. 
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Table 2: Companies studied: industry affiliation and ownership status  
 Avia-Co Avia-Ent Mechanics-Co Mechanics-Ent 
Sub-sector Aviation Aviation Machine-building 
and metal-working 
Machine-building 
and munitions 
 
Ownership 
status 
 
Open joint-stock 
company from 
1992, state 
‘Golden share’* 
 
State-owned 
enterprise until 
2002, when it 
was transformed 
into a state joint-
stock company 
and became part 
of a state 
kontserni** 
 
Open joint-stock 
company from 
1993, state ‘Golden 
share’ 
 
State-owned 
enterprise; 
bankruptcy 
procedure started in 
2003, went bankrupt, 
transformed into an 
open joint-stock 
company in 2007  
 
* A ‘Golden Share’ is retained by the state, giving the state a right to veto any decision of the company, which could 
be damaging to national security. 
 
 
** Kontsern is Russian for a group of companies and is derived from the German term Konzern with the same 
meaning. 
 
 
 
Networking 
Avia-Co, Avia-Ent and Mechanics-Co actively used their network links to 
local/regional and national administrations. These three enterprises benefited from oblast’ 
governor’s connections in Moscow and the role played by representatives of the state defence 
export agency Rosvooruzhenie (replaced by Rosoboroneksport in 2000), which helped secure 
export contracts for the defence companies of the oblast’, according to a regional newspaper. 
This was especially the case for Mechanics-Co, which used administrative networks to 
sustain it mainly through export contracts, such as producing spare parts for another company 
that had an export contract. This ‘link’ was facilitated by the oblast’ administration. 
The director and top managers of Avia-Co and Mechanics-Co devoted a lot of time 
going on trips to secure different subsidies and grants from the federal government as well as 
from the local government budgets. In the case of Avia-Co this resulted in financial assistance 
from the federal budget in 1995, achieved through lobbying on the part of the director of 
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Avia-Co and the regional authorities during the Prime Minister’s visit to the oblast’.  As the 
Director of Avia-Co commented: 
Our financial difficulties were very much alleviated when Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin signed a special document securing financial help to our company; it 
was quick coming too - after two-and-a-half months the funds were transferred from 
the federal budget.
3
  
Another later example of the use of administrative networks was a loan of Rb 106 million to 
Avia-Co from the oblast’ budget, which was extended in 2003 at an interest rate of 1% (the 
standard interest rate in the local banks was 21-23%), in 2003. According to a regional 
newspaper, these very favourable conditions were secured through close ties between the 
company’s director and the leaders of the oblast’ administration. Moreover, the oblast’ 
administration made the money for Avia-Co’s loan available from the oblast’ road fund, thus 
putting on hold the maintenance of the region’s road network. Here the administrative ties 
secured financial assistance (as a loan on very favourable conditions can be considered) to 
Avia-Co from the regional authorities. 
As far as Avia-Ent is concerned, it survived the difficult economic conditions mainly 
through using its network links with the city and oblast’ administration, and with the missile 
and artillery state agencies. The enterprise used these networks to lobby for financial 
assistance and to increase its military production (both the state military procurement order 
and export of defence production). As the Director of Avia-Ent admitted: 
Thanks to good relations with the Central missile and artillery board and the Navy, a 
prepayment was received for a state military order in mid-1993. Later, connections 
helped matters to improve in 1994 when assistance from the Board of anti-missile 
defence and “Rosvooruzhenie” state military export company facilitated the signing 
of an export contract. 
 
The reliance on these networks is not surprising since the enterprise was prohibited from 
privatising. The enterprise’s strategic importance was recognized by the government when 
Avia-Ent was included in a state defence kontsern (group of companies) in 2002. Substantial 
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increase in military production drove the enterprise’s recovery and growth. The background 
of the director at Avia-Ent is significant as well. According to a regional paper, up until 1998 
he had worked at the enterprise in various departments. At this point, he went to work as the 
representative of “Rosvooruzhenie” in the oblast’. In 1999 he was encouraged, not only by 
his former colleagues but also by the oblast’ governor, to take up the post of Avia-Ent’s 
director.  This set of relationships contributed largely to the following recovery and success 
of the enterprise. 
A contrasting picture is presented by the developments at Mechanics-Ent, which 
unlike the other enterprises was not actively assisted by the oblast’ and city administrations. 
The Director of Mechanics-Ent described their management strategy to tackle the difficult 
financial situation in 1994 as follows: 
We transformed production units into separate legal entities with their own accounts. 
The enterprise as a whole contributed assets to these, however, the sale of products 
was made the responsibility of these new legal entities.  
 
The problem was that this structure caused suspicion on the part of the tax authorities, who 
claimed it was asset stripping. The Prosecutor General’s office also took an interest in the 
organisational developments at the state-owned enterprise. Having carried out an audit, 
Mechanics-Ent’s top management decided to abandon this structure in 1995. Nonetheless, 
this affected Mechanics-Ent’s reputation. Moreover, it is hard to say whether related to this or 
not, the Ministry of Defence had complete disregard for this enterprise (as demonstrated by 
not paying for a placed order and not procuring more state military orders). Therefore, the 
regional and local authorities were not willing to fight an apparently lost cause of bringing 
defence production back to the enterprise.  
In 1995 the director personally pleaded with the then Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin to cancel mutual debts between the enterprise and the federal budget, but no 
action was taken. The Director of Mechanics-Ent commented: 
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To be noticed by the state is the most important aspect in aiding the recovery of the 
enterprise. 
 
Mechanics-Ent’s appeals for help from the state budget were not achieving any results, 
because unlike other studied defence sector organisations, which actively used the oblast’ and 
city administrations as channels for lobbying the federal government bodies, Mechanics-Ent 
could no longer rely on these networks.  
Avia-Co was the more dynamic of the two privatised defence-related companies in 
terms of developing civilian output and new, commercial networks. In 1995 Avia-Co, in its 
capacity as a manufacturer of components focused on developing links with other companies 
and enterprises. For example, as a supplier of pump motors the company was a member of a 
business network producing washing machines, according to Avia-Co’s newspaper. Managers 
at Avia-Co also realised the advantages of participating in relevant trade fairs and product 
exhibitions both in Russia and abroad. As Avia-Co’s Chief Economist pointed out:  
The main aims at trade fairs and product exhibitions were: to compare the company’s 
product range and quality with similar output of other manufacturers, to make contact 
with potential customers, and to network with potential collaborators.  
 
New developing relations with civilian producers were built on process-based trust. Trust in 
this case had to be developed gradually, as recognized by the Director of Avia-Co in 1995: 
Trust is very important in business relationships. When starting to work with a 
business partner, one has to start from a small contract and gradually to build up the 
business as mutual confidence in the partners increases. 
 
Also, in 1995, one of the largest Russian car manufacturers mounted an extensive search for an 
appropriate partner to produce machine parts. Crucially, the Russian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, having had previous relations with Avia-Co, provided the information about the tender 
that helped Avia-Co to secure it. (Avia-Co beat four other companies to gain this contract.) A 
joint venture with a foreign company was established to produce electrical and technical parts 
for the car industry. This indicates that, in the case of some of its civilian products, this 
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company managed to be included in existing supply chains through joining established 
business networks. An important aspect of this is the possibility of dual use (military and 
civilian) of technology and equipment. Avia-Co had the opportunity to use the mechanics 
technology and equipment (normally used in its defence production) for the car industry. The 
other enterprises studied either were not successful in developing these commercial networks 
(such as Mechanics-Co and Mechanics-Ent) or, as in the case of Avia-Ent, focused mainly on 
the defence output and kept the civilian production on a minimal level, thus not being 
interested in developing such networks.   
According to the information provided by Mechanics-Co, this company had most 
problems in developing a strong range of civilian products and did not develop opportunities 
to join commercial networks related to civilian products. Many civilian goods developed by 
Mechanics-Co entered the market too late and had to compete with already established 
domestically produced goods and imported brands. Instead, much of the company’s 
production space was rented out to other businesses.  
Mechanics-Ent tried to survive by becoming a mostly civilian-oriented machine-
building plant. This was difficult to achieve because it was not able to sell their output 
(equipment and consumer goods) on an appropriate level (in terms of volume) to sustain 
itself, even though this enterprise attempted to develop certain commercial networks. A 
positive example was the development of relations with agricultural producers. The 
continuation of relationships based on economic ties from the Soviet period formed another 
strand in Mechanics-Ent’s strategy. For example, in Soviet times the enterprise had supplied 
spare parts to agricultural-machinery producers.  Relations with heads of farms, etc, 
continued to be developed. To meet the subsequent demand for agricultural machinery (and 
meet the need for its maintenance) a joint-stock company, which included relevant 
production shops, was created in 1995. By 1996 agricultural producers/farms were placing 
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orders for spare parts and the enterprise was accepting monetary and barter payments, and 
was offering an opportunity to lease machinery. However, agricultural producers were not 
able to provide consistent demand for agricultural machinery. 
An important civilian line developed at the enterprise was medical equipment. 
However, production of medical equipment was problematic, according to the Director of 
Mechanics-Ent: 
The enterprise experienced pressure and active undermining of its products by certain 
groups that were more interested in importing this type of equipment than in its 
development within Russia. 
 
The situation was more positive with school furniture production, e.g., a school in the oblast’ 
was equipped with furniture produced at Mechanics-Ent and the payment was counted 
towards repayment of a tax debt to the federal budget. Managers at Mechanics-Ent, like their 
counterparts in the other companies, actively participated in international fairs, networking, 
and business trips. In 1996 these resulted in the signing of several agreements with foreign 
companies to produce assembly parts: a car manufacturing company in Poland; a machinery 
producer in Italy; and a lock producer in the Ukraine. Nonetheless, these positive attempts 
provided contracts on too small a scale for the enterprise to sustain itself and not to go 
bankrupt.  
 
Developments in enterprises after 1998 
All of the enterprises benefited from the improvement of the economic situation in the 
Russian economy triggered by the effects of the devaluation of the rouble after the 1998 
financial crisis (Sutela, 1999; Arkhipov et al., 2003). Especially noteworthy here are the 
import-substitution in civilian production and improved conditions for export (mostly defence 
output) as a result of devaluation. 
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 Two of the studied companies became members of larger corporate structures, which 
was beneficial for their development.  Mechanics-Co became a member of a financial-
industrial group in 1998. In 2002 Avia-Ent was transformed into a state closed joint-stock 
company through a process of corporatisation and was included in a state defence kontsern. 
Being part of this structure ensured consistent state military procurement order at the 
enterprise. 
Emerging into the present, the most dynamic out of the enterprises studied were Avia-
Co with both its growing military and civilian production and Avia-Ent with a substantial 
emphasis on military production. At Avia-Co during 2010 there was significant investment in 
new equipment and modernisation as well recruitment of young specialists into middle 
management positions. Also, in the last two years Avia-Co’s director had been heading the 
region’s affiliate organisations of Russia’s Union of Machine-builders and the All-Russian 
Council of Local Self-Government
4
 representing the region at the national level. The other 
most successful enterprise, Avia-Ent, remaining in state ownership, has experienced 
substantial growth in the state military order and in defence-related exports since 2000 and, 
according to Avia-Ent’s Director’s statement posted on its website, planned to maintain this 
position in 2013. 
In contrast, Mechanics-Co kept shrinking in terms of the number of employees (e.g., 
in mid-2007 it was less than half of the 1996 level, totalling 2,320) and having an increasing 
share of overall income from renting out space (14% by mid-2007 from 0.9% in 1995).  
However, the share of production was still 75% of overall income. Since 2009 the number of 
employees has stabilised at around 3,300. In 2009 the production of defence output grew by 
50%, though civilian output decreased by 25%. Currently half of all production is covered by 
the state military order and 47% is defence-related exports. 
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As for Mechanics-Ent, this enterprise experienced severe financial difficulties. Having 
accumulated debts for tax payments, payments to energy suppliers and its employees, 
Mechanics-Ent had its assets frozen in 2002, resulting in a start of a bankruptcy procedure in 
2003. After a protracted and problematic period of bankruptcy Mechanics-Ent was 
transformed in mid-2007 into an open joint-stock company (OJSCo), established according to 
the 2002 Law on Bankruptcy and the decision of the creditors of Mechanics-Ent. In 2008 a 
new top management team signed a contract to assemble and later produce dairy industry 
equipment. In 2009 the newly-operating OJSCo was given a state military contract. It is 
difficult to ascertain what production capacity these developments are utilising since by the 
end of 2013 OJSCo was advertising spare industrial capacity, storage and office space, and a 
canteen for rent. 
 
DISCUSSION: Gr’ip AND Fl’ip NETWORKS TYPOLOGY 
This study reveals two different types of network of defence sector organisations. A new 
typology of Gr’ip (Grooved Inter-relationship Patterns) and Fl’ip (Fluid Inter-relationship 
Patterns) networks is developed signifying these different types of relationships.   
 
What are Gr’ip networks? 
Grooved Inter-relationship Patterns (Gr’ip) networks are based on administrative links 
developed during the existence of the Soviet Union, whereby organisations are still locked 
into a ‘grooved’ relationship with different levels of administration and state authorities. 
Gr’ip networks thus constitute the relations carried over from the Soviet period, when the 
defence enterprises in the Soviet Union had close administrative ties to the relevant ministries 
and to the local administration. These links were reinforced by close relations with the local 
Communist Party committee, though after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the latter no 
longer operated. However, even though the apparatus of central planning with its agencies 
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and ministries was dismantled (Clarke, 2007), the Ministry of Defence retained its 
significance, and, after the start of economic transformation, some administrative ties 
continued to function. For example, networks were exploited to lobby for the defence 
enterprise’s interests, both in terms of maintaining state military orders/procurement and 
supporting the enterprise’s social amenities, at the level of the government and that of the 
Ministry of Defence – traditionally seen as the most direct way to further a defence 
enterprise’s aims. These Gr’ip networks had always been important for securing military 
defence contracts, and their importance in securing defence export contracts continued after 
the start of transition. Export orders provided an increasingly significant (even crucial) part of 
a company’s output as the defence companies studied could not export defence output 
independently, but only through the state defence export agency Rosvooruzhenie, or 
Rosoboroneksport, its successor from 2000. 
In the Gr’ip type of network trust is based on cultivating personal-trust relationships 
with governmental and administrative officials of different levels (see also Xin and Pearce, 
1996; Peng, 2000), and it is the links with the administrative authorities of different levels 
that bind the parties in co-operation for mutual gain. All parties (the companies and the 
administrative authorities) are bound by this chain, without which either would find it 
difficult to operate. Defence enterprises provide employment, which secures social and 
economic stability in a region and contribute to housing, health and recreation costs for their 
employees, providing services which in most other countries are provided by local authorities 
(Kosals and Izyumov, 2011). This network is built on relations established in the command-
administrative system and still has a flavour of the Soviet-type relationships between the 
authorities of different levels and the economic agents, underpinned in the Soviet period by 
both coercive and non-coercive power exercised by the authorities of different levels over the 
economic agents. From the start of the transition process, the local authorities were lobbying 
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the federal authorities for substantial financial support in the form of subsidies for the large 
enterprises, arguing that it was necessary for maintaining local social stability (Slinko et al., 
2003; Aslund, 2007).  
Mutual dependence characterises the relationship within the Gr’ip networks. The 
potential for withdrawing support (lobbying for state subsidies, etc., on the part of the local 
and regional authorities; and political support, including votes, on the part of the defence 
enterprises) forms the basis for non-coercive power that both these actors possess over each 
other. On the other hand, this underlying power is combined with trust built on a personal 
level and strengthened through the long-term nature of the relationship. The Gr’ip networks 
between the defence enterprises and administrative authorities of different levels are based on 
a combination of power and trust. 
 
What are Fl’ip networks? 
Fluid Inter-relationship Patterns (Fl’ip) networks are based on company links formed in the 
post-Soviet period; these ‘fluid’ relationships are based on mutually advantageous economic 
exchange in developing market conditions. Fl’ip networks relate to the defence companies’ 
civilian output rather than to defence output, and operate in developing market conditions. 
Defence production, both in Russia and in the West, has a specific, non-market culture 
involving close government supervision, secrecy, detailed technical specifications and 
standards that need to be met, costs determined by technical requirements, quality over cost 
considerations, etc. The difference in company practice and culture between defence and 
commercial business in relation to the US is outlined in Office of Technology Assessment, 
1992; Cooper (1991) examines similar issues in relation to the Soviet Union and Kennaway 
(1994) - in relation to Russia. Thus, Fl’ip networks are not linked to defence production.  
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It is noteworthy that defence enterprises also produced civilian goods in the Soviet 
period (Cooper, 1991), which was done under conditions of a planned economy, where there 
were no incentives such as efficiency and profitability. In post-Soviet conditions, however, 
collaborating with civilian companies in order to produce civilian goods takes place in a 
developing market economy. Defence companies’ civilian output, thus, needs to compete 
with the civilian economy’s output from both domestic and foreign producers. Fl’ip networks 
are inter-firm networks between defence companies and civilian producers in a developing 
market economy of Russia. 
There are two main ways for the defence companies to develop economic relations 
with civilian producers. They can act independently to initiate contacts and exchange 
information by attending trade and industry fairs and exhibitions and by participating in 
tenders. Or they can develop Fl’ip networks through third parties, who will mediate and 
provide guarantees of reputation, such as the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
other companies that have been long-term business partners, or city and oblast’ 
administrations.  
Trust that develops in Fl’ip networks is process-based. Fl’ip networks, unlike Gr’ip 
networks, are not developed in the administrative or control sphere (where the main activity 
is lobbying for state support and for continuation of defence contracts) but in the economic or 
productive sphere. Here the defence companies seek out economic agents of the developing 
private sector so as to develop supply chains of civilian products.  The nature of trust 
developed in this instance enhances mutually advantageous relations based on being partners 
in an economic exchange. As noted, an uncertain institutional environment makes it difficult 
to enforce contracts and to protect property rights. Contracts under these circumstances are 
more or less based on trust and on mechanisms of responsibility. If one reneges on an 
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agreement, it is not legal liability that is feared but the loss of business partners’ trust, 
cornering out of the market, and eventually bankruptcy (Gutnik, 1996). 
Establishing and maintaining trust in Fl’ip networks is supported by third-party 
mediations and referrals, which provide guarantees of reputation, and this is based on 
individual-level trust. The progression from contractual and competence levels of trust to 
goodwill trust will depend on the continuity of repeated exchanges and establishment of a 
long-term relationship. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study sought to understand how organisations respond to institutional change during a 
process of creating market institutions. The study reveals that using links from the previous 
Soviet period and developing new links in the developing market economy is the key 
explanation. Two different types of network of defence sector organisations are identified and 
the Russian defence companies develop these two types of network as a response to the 
institutional changes within the Russian post-Soviet context. A new typology of Gr’ip 
(Grooved Inter-relationship Patterns) and Fl’ip (Fluid Inter-relationship Patterns) networks 
is developed. Gr’ip networks are relations with administrative bodies of local/regional/federal 
level, which are rooted in the Soviet past; and linked with defence production. The legacy of 
power relationships between the defence enterprises and administrative authorities of 
different levels is strong here, forming the basis for co-ordinating expectations and 
interaction between the defence industry organisations and the administrative authorities. 
Fl’ip networks are relations based on mutually advantageous economic exchange with 
civilian goods producers underpinned by process-based trust initiated by third-party 
mediations and referrals, providing guarantees of reputation.  
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The study shows that the success of these companies ultimately depended on their ability 
to manage and develop existing Gr’ip networks established in the Soviet period. Developing 
new relationships in the commercial worlds in and beyond Russia was a source of additional 
strength for Avia-Co. Development of these networks, however, is taken as an addition to 
objective factors, such as the type of output, ageing plant and equipment (which some of the 
organisations studied managed to modernize), location and transport links with access to 
suppliers and markets (which was good for the oblast’), well-laid out premises (since these are 
defence companies, they had priority in Soviet times in terms of superior facilities), well-
developed and maintained urban infrastructure (partly developed and maintained by the 
organisations studied) to attract the work force (Clarke, 2007). 
It needs to be stressed that defence exports drove and continue to drive the growth of 
the defence companies studied, as well as the Russian defence sector in general. The role of 
Gr’ip networks here is of paramount significance. This is especially the case for defence 
enterprises in the provinces that cannot export defence-related output independently of 
Rosoboronekport, as is the case for the enterprises studied. Many of the defence export 
contracts were established during the Soviet times and the ‘exportability’ of the output to 
particular parts of the world was already determined. It can be deduced that the Gr’ip 
networks help develop these contracts and help to find new ones, though it is then up to the 
defence company itself to supply goods of the requisite quality. The importance of Gr’ip 
networks is best demonstrated by Mechanics-Ent. The local authorities were not on its side, 
were less supportive than they were of other defence organisations, such that Mechanics-Ent 
was unable to cope with the difficult economic conditions and to avoid bankruptcy.   
Previous research on strategy in transition economies has demonstrated that as the 
transition progresses and the institutional environment changes, the role of networks and 
relationships decreases and the role of market-oriented strategies increases (Peng, 2003; 
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Danis et al., 2010). Due to the weakness of market institutions in Russia this response to 
institutional changes has not been mirrored within the context studied. Through the 
exploration of how these companies adapted to the systemic shift from a planned 
administrative system to a market-type system (and this exploration was taking a 
longitudinal, rather than a snapshot, view) it became clear that the Gr’ip and Fl’ip types of 
network made it possible for these companies to find a way to survive and develop. 
Moreover, the analysis brings to the fore the importance of the relationship between a state-
owned company (or a previously state-owned company) and regional/local authorities, and 
through them, national-level authorities as well. It is the continued reliance on these 
relationships conceptualised as the Gr’ip network that is the significant finding of this study. 
The context for this study was very specific, so caution must be exercised in 
considering to what extent this research can be generalised. Nonetheless, there is an 
implication that this type of research might offer similar findings in other post-socialist and 
emerging economies contexts with a similar level of institutional development offering 
potential for further research. Gr’ip and Fl’ip types of network are relevant to organisations 
that were owned and regulated by the state during the state-socialist period and that still have 
a state involvement when a market-oriented economy is being developed. Future research can 
analyse other such sectors as well as the defence sector in different emerging market contexts 
and what implications the existence of Gr’ip and Fl’ip networks in these sectors has for 
engaging in international collaborations and the potential interplay between trust and power 
in these inter-organisational relations. Another stream of further research needs to analyse 
whether and how Gr’ip and Fl’ip network ties influence each other. This study also offers a 
theoretical underpinning for analysing the use of interpersonal trust in wider contexts 
characterised by low system trust, opening further avenues for research. 
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NOTES 
1 For an analysis of the Russian privatisation process see Filatotchev et al. (1996). For a comparison of 
valuation methods of state-owned companies put up for sale in developed market, transition and developing 
economies and whether these matched privatisation objectives stated by the governments see Gonzalo et al. 
(2003). For an overview of privatisation within the context of the Russian defence industry see Sanchez-Andres 
(1998). 
2 Oblast’ is Russian for region and denotes an administrative territorial division within the Russian Federation. 
The transliteration uses the Library of Congress Romanization Table for Russian, where the soft sign is depicted 
by an apostrophe. Since the region is anonymised, it is referred to as just oblast’. 
3 Interview quotations were translated from Russian into English by the author. 
4 The All-Russian Council of Local Self-Government is a voluntary, member-based, self-governing association 
established on 31 May 2006 in order to promote an effective system of local government and to develop citizen 
participation in the work of local government, including charitable and volunteer work. Membership covers all 
regions of the Russian Federation.  
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